Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois Experience by Whitfield, Wenona Y.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 14 Justice, Ethics, and Interdisciplinary Teaching and Practice | Mental Health and the 
Law 
January 2004 
Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois Experience 
Wenona Y. Whitfield 
Southern Illinois University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wenona Y. Whitfield, Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois Experience, 14 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 
385 (2004), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol14/iss1/13 
This Mental Health and the Law - Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at 
Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of 
Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, 
please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
385 
Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois 
Experience 
Wenona Y. Whitfield∗ 
When mental health patients refuse to accept voluntary 
administration of psychotropic medicine, Illinois is one of several 
states that provides for a judicial hearing to determine whether the 
patient’s wishes should be overruled.1 One of the principal issues in 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Adjunct 
Professor, Department of Medical Humanities and Psychiatry, Southern Illinois University 
School of Medicine. 
 1. I begin with the assumption that psychotropic medication works. The terms 
psychotropic and antipsychotic are used synonymously in this Article. “‘Psychotropic 
medication’ means medication whose use for antipsychotic, antidepressant, antimanic, 
antianxiety, behavioral modification or behavioral management purposes is listed in AMA Drug 
Evaluations, latest edition, or Physician’s Desk Reference, latest edition, or which are 
administered for any of these purposes.” 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-121.1. See also 53 AM. JUR. 
2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 113 (1996) (providing a comprehensive discussion of 
psychotropic medication); Catherine E. Blackburn, The “Therapeutic Orgy” and the “Right to 
Rot” Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 447 
(1990) (providing a brief description of the side effects associated with psychotropic 
medications). The overwhelming view of the medical community is that psychotropic drugs are 
very effective. See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, Rotting With Their Rights On: 
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979); William M. Greenberg et al., Patients’ Attitudes 
Toward Having Been Forcibly Medicated, 24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 513 (1996); 
E. Fuller Torrey, Protecting the Rights, the Person, and the Public: A Biological Basis for 
Responsible Action, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 17 (2000). According to medical 
professionals, adherence to a prescribed regimen of psychotropic medication allows patients to 
function normally. “Compared with psychotic patients who take medications, unmedicated 
psychotic patients have longer hospital stays, are more likely to require seclusion or restraint 
during hospitalization, and have higher rates of actual or threatened assaults. Unmedicated 
depressed patients are more likely than their medicated counterparts to commit suicide.” Malini 
Patel & Daniel W. Hardy, Encouraging Pursuit of Court-Ordered Treatment in a State 
Hospital, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1656 (2001). I also begin with the assumption that persons 
subject to involuntary commitment are capable of deciding to refuse psychotropic medication, 
despite of physicians’ and psychiatrists’ firm belief that medication can significantly reduce 
mental illness symptoms and improve quality of life. In Illinois, involuntary commitment does 
not include authority to administer medication against a patient’s wishes. In re Phyllis P., 695 
N.E.2d 851, 853 (Ill. 1998) (expressly prohibiting administration of psychotropic medications 
without the patient’s consent). “[A]n adjudication of mental illness is not an adjudication of 
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the judicial hearing is whether the patient has the capacity to make an 
informed choice to refuse the medication. Physicians and 
psychiatrists view judicial hearings as problematic for several 
reasons. One obvious problem is that declining staff resources are 
diverted from treatment to litigation. Psychiatrists also dislike 
testifying “against” their patients and believe such testimony is 
damaging to the therapist/patient relationship. Finally, psychiatrists 
question judges’ ability to understand the underlying pharmacology 
involved in administering appropriate psychotropic medications.2 
Those in favor of courts deciding involuntary medication cases 
point to past abuses of medication and the underlying liberty interests 
at stake when forcing any type of medical treatment on an unwilling 
patient.3 Neither the proponents nor the opponents of judicial 
hearings for involuntary medication cases are likely to be satisfied 
with the record under the Illinois involuntary medication statute 
 
incompetence to direct one’s legal affairs.” Moreover, the refusal to take medication is not a 
ground for involuntary commitment. In re Schumaker, 633 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994). See also In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 65, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (citations omitted) (“A variety 
of courts have recognized that informed consent and the right to refuse medical treatment are 
concepts grounded in the common law right to be free from nonconsensual bodily invasions, 
the individual liberty interest in personal autonomy and bodily integrity, and the right to privacy 
protected by the United States and Illinois Constitutions.”). 
 The focus of this Article is on those patients who are receiving treatment on a voluntary or 
involuntary basis in a civil rather than a criminal context. The State has a far greater interest in 
seeking involuntary medication of patients who are in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); U.S. v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted in part, 537 U.S. 999 (2002); Jami Floyd, The Administration of Psychotropic Drugs to 
Prisoners: State of the Law and Beyond, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1243 (1990). 
 2. For an excellent treatment of the medical/legal debate involving involuntary 
medication issues, see Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No:” A History and Analysis 
of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283 (1992); Bruce J. Winick, The 
Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1 (1989). 
 3. Numerous articles have been written about the benefits and problems of conducting 
judicial hearings when a mental health patient refuses to take psychotropic medications 
voluntarily. Not surprisingly, treatment providers overwhelmingly favor non-judicial decision-
makers. See, e.g., Thomas G. Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug Refusal, Involuntary 
Medication and “Rotting with Your Rights On”, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 327 (1980); Torrey, 
supra note 1. Lawyers and patient advocates, on the other hand, believe that judicial 
involvement is essential since involuntary medication raises constitutional issues. See Michael 
L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions and Wastin’ Time?” 
Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to 
Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 114 (1996). 
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because, in the author’s view, the statute has proven unworkable for 
patients, physicians, and the courts. 
This Article examines decisions involving involuntary medication 
in Illinois over the past decade, with a particular emphasis on how 
judges decide whether the patient has the capacity to refuse 
medication. The author concludes that Illinois courts have 
demonstrated an inability to decide questions of competency, and that 
a more efficient system that protects the rights of mental health 
patients is needed.  
Part I briefly surveys the present statutory scheme in Illinois and 
in other states that have chosen a judicial model for deciding 
questions of a patient’s competency to refuse psychotropic 
medication. Part II analyzes appellate decisions from Illinois, 
emphasizing the inability of judges to articulate a standard for 
competency. Part III concludes with a proposal for amending the 
legislative standard for determining competency and suggests an 
alternative model for determining competency of patients refusing 
psychotropic medication.  
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR DECIDING A PATIENT’S RIGHT 
TO REFUSE MEDICATION 
In non-emergency situations,4 a number of states provide for 
judicial hearings for involuntary administration of psychotropic 
drugs.5 Within this group, the procedures for approving involuntary 
medication vary.  
 
 4. All states that require judicial approval for administration of psychotropic medication 
over a patient’s objections have procedures to override the patient’s objections when the patient 
or others may be in imminent danger or in some other emergency situation. See, e.g., CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-543(b) (2003). 
 5. The states include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.839 (LexisNexis 2003); 
California, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5332, 5334 (West 2003); Colorado, COL. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 27-10-111 (West 2002); Delaware, 16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 5006, 5161 (1995); 
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4598 (West 2002); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334E-2 
(Michie 2000) and HAW. CODE RULES § 11-175-45 (a); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 12-27-5-2 
(West 2002); Illinois, 405 ILLINOIS COMP. STAT. 5/2-107.1 (2003); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 202A.196(3); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., Health Gen. I § 10-708 (2000); 
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 8B (West 1986); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 253B.092 (West 2002); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-81, 41-21-99 (2001); 
Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127 (2001); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-15 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A few states have a treatment plan that incorporates involuntary 
medication into the initial commitment hearing.6 In Connecticut, the 
statute gives a treatment facility the option to establish an internal 
procedure for involuntary medication or to request a medication order 
from the court.7 In Maryland and Indiana, the state is allowed to 
forcibly medicate a patient unless the patient initiates a formal 
process for judicial intervention.8 A substantial number of states 
require the therapist or treatment facility to seek court authorization 
before a patient can be involuntarily medicated.9  
 
(Michie 2000); New York, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.8 (1995); North 
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE, § 25-03.1-18.1 (2002); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 
(Anderson 2000); Pennsylvania, 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304 (West 2003); Texas, TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.106, 576.025 (Vernon 2003); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18, §§ 7625, 7627 (2000); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.21 (Michie 2003); 
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.370 (West 2003); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 51.61,51.20 (West 2003). 
 6. States within this group include: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-530 (West 
2003); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 66-322 (Michie 2000); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B 
(West 1988); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A (West 2002); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-10-110 (LexisNexis 2003). 
 7. CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 17a-543 (West 2003). 
 8. In Maryland, the initial decision to medicate may be appealed to an in-house clinical 
review panel. Panel decisions can be appealed to an administrative board and then to the Circuit 
Court. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-708. In Indiana, the involuntarily committed 
patient who wants to refuse treatment may petition the committing court. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-
27-5-2. 
 9. In addition to Illinois, 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-107.1, states within this group 
include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.836, 47.30.839 (LexisNexis 2003) (facility may seek 
court approval); California, CAL WELF. & INST CODE §§ 5332, 5334 (hearing required to 
determine person’s incapacity to refuse treatment); Colorado, COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-
111 (committing court has jurisdiction to require involuntary medication); Delaware, 16 DEL. 
CO. ANN. tit. 16 §§ 5161, 5006 (medication only as authorized by applicable law or court 
order); Florida, FLA STAT. ANN. § 394.4598 (facility administrator may petition court for 
appointment of a guardian advocate with power to consent to medication); Hawaii, HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 334E-2 and HAW. ADMIN. R. § 11-175-45 A (patients have a right to refuse 
medication except where a court order exists); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.196(3) 
(hospital may petition court to determine the appropriateness of proposed treatment, following 
an in-house treatment committee’s renew); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 123, 
§ 8B (judicial petition for involuntary medication required); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 253B.092 (upon a showing of lack of capacity and propriety of medication, “the court shall 
appoint a substitute decision maker with authority to consent to administration of neuroleptic 
medication”); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-81, 41-21-99 (medication proceeding to 
be similar to commitment proceeding); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127(6) (2001) 
(court may authorize appropriate medication); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-15 
(treatment professional may petition the court for appointment of a guardian to make a 
substitute decision that is advisory to the court); New York, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol14/iss1/13
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A. The Illinois Statutory Scheme for Involuntary Medication 
The Illinois statute for involuntary medication has a number of 
mandatory procedural requirements.10 The statute includes a “notice 
of rights” provision requiring that every recipient of services be 
notified of their rights, including the right to receive written notice of 
the side effects, risks, and benefits of proposed treatment11 and the 
right to refuse treatment.12 The Illinois statute also requires that 
medication hearings be conducted separate from commitment 
hearings13 and that persons opposing involuntary medication be 
 
14, § 527.8 (clinical director may apply for court authorization of treatment); North Dakota, 
N.D. CENT. CODE, § 25-03.1-18.1 (2002) (treating psychiatrist may request authorization to 
treat person under a “mental health treatment order”); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 
(petition to court for involuntary medication required); Pennsylvania, 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7304 (court-ordered involuntary treatment allowed for persons already subject to involuntary 
treatment); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 574.106, 576.025 (court order for 
psychoactive medications required); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7627 (court may order 
appropriate medication); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.21.A (court may authorize 
withholding or withdrawal of specific treatment); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.05.370(7) (West 2003) (court may authorize treatment); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 51.20(7)(d), 51.61(9)(g)(2) (court may determine after a hearing that the individual is not 
competent to refuse medication).  
 10. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-107.1. The Illinois statute governing involuntary 
medication for mental health patients is a result of a commission appointed by the Governor in 
1989 to revise the Mental Health Code. That commission found “serious flaws in the failure to 
provide adequate guidelines for the involuntary administration of psychotropic substances” and 
numerous shortcomings in the use of guardianship proceedings to determine if involuntary 
administration of psychotropic medication should be ordered. COMM’N TO REVISE THE MENTAL 
HEALTH CODE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMM’N TO REVISE THE MENTAL 
HEALTH CODE OF ILL. 44-47 (1989). “The Commission recommended that the Mental Health 
Code be amended to specifically provide for the involuntary administration of psychotropic 
medication in nonemergency settings.” In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ill. 1994). The Illinois 
statute is an example of what noted authority Michael Perlin refers to as an “expanded due 
process model.” See Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 3, at 122-23. 
 11. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-102(a-5) (2002). 
 12. Several statutory provisions refer to the right to refuse treatment and general rights of 
mental health service recipients: 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/2-107(a), 5-200(d), 5/3 (2003). 
 13. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-107.1(a-5)(2) (2002). As a practical matter, the 
involuntary medication hearing is often held immediately following the civil commitment 
hearing, usually with the same witnesses and participants. See In re Emmert J., 775 N.E.2d 193 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Even though the involuntary commitment hearing and the involuntary 
administration of medication hearing are to be heard separately, it seems overly formalistic to 
require, as one court has, that the court hold two hearings. In re Miller, 705 N.E.2d 144, 151 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding a trial judge cannot “conduct ‘separate hearings’ during the same 
hearing and enter separate findings on each petition.”). 
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provided with counsel.14 Illinois statutes also provide that the person 
subject to involuntary medication has the right to be present at the 
hearing,15 the right to have the involuntary medication issue tried 
before a jury,16 and the right to an independent examination.17 
Substantively, the statute requires that the trial court find by clear 
and convincing evidence that all of the following factors are present 
before it can issue an order for involuntary medication:  
(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or 
developmental disability. 
(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental 
disability, the recipient exhibits any one of the following: (i) 
deterioration of his ability to function, (ii) suffering, or (iii) 
threatening behavior. 
(C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period 
marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set forth 
in item (B) of this subdivision . . . or the repeated episodic 
occurrence of these symptoms. 
 
 14. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-805 (2003). Although the statute refers to involuntary 
commitment proceedings, it is equally applicable to proceedings with respect to the involuntary 
administration of psychotropic medication pursuant to 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-107.1. See 
also In re Jones, 743 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); In re Barbara H., 702 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. 
1998). The court, in Jones, expressly held that a guardian ad litem could not be substituted for 
an attorney: 
A guardian ad litem and an attorney serve two distinct functions. A guardian ad litem 
is responsible for representing the respondent’s best interests as opposed to serving as 
an advocate for the respondent’s possibly ill-advised desires. While a guardian ad 
litem may properly determine that psychotropic medication is in the respondent’s best 
interest, an attorney is necessary to advocate on the respondent’s behalf. The roles 
necessarily conflict with one another.  
Jones, 743 N.E.2d at 1093 (citations omitted). 
 The following jurisdictions also mandate appointment of counsel for involuntary 
medication: Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-415(A)(1) (West 2002); Florida, FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 394.4598(1) (West 2002); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 66-329(g) (Michie 2002); 
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(3) (West 2002). Of course, the right to be represented by 
counsel does not ensure good or effective representation. See generally Perlin & Dorfman, 
supra note 3.  
 15. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-806 (2002). See also Barbara H., 702 N.E.2d at 558. 
 16. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-802-803 (2002). 
 17. Id. § 5/3-804. See also In re R.C., 788 N.E.2d 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol14/iss1/13
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(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm. 
(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned 
decision about the treatment. 
(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and 
found inappropriate.18 
II. ILLINOIS DECISIONS REGARDING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE 
MEDICATION 
Advocates for mental health patients and the drafters of the 
Illinois involuntary medication statutes likely assumed that detailed 
procedural requirements and substantive rights would lead to 
transparency in treatment decisions and overall improvement in 
care.19 Unfortunately, decisions rendered by the courts within the last 
ten years have largely demonstrated confusion and indifference in 
regards to procedural matters. The cases also reveal a lack of a 
uniform analytical framework for deciding substantive capacity 
issues.  
A. Procedural Confusion 
The Illinois involuntary medication statute contains a 
straightforward provision for the contents of a court order authorizing 
involuntary treatment. The court order must: (1) designate the 
persons authorized to administer the treatment, and (2) specify the 
medications and the anticipated range of authorized dosages.20 
Physicians and psychiatrists can complain legitimately that the 
statutory provisions are, at best, unnecessary. Apparently, these 
requirements are meant to “prevent abuses of involuntary 
administration”21 and ensure that the medication will not be used for 
“the patient’s therapy, but for the purposes of managing and 
 
 18. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-107.1(4)(A-E) (2002). 
 19. See generally COMM’N TO REVISE THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILL., supra note 10. 
 20. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-107.1(a-5)(6) (2002). 
 21. In re Emmett J., 775 N.E.2d 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
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disciplining the patient.”22 According to one court, requiring the order 
to specifically identify the person who is authorized to provide the 
medication also ensures that a professional who is familiar with the 
patient’s specific needs and health history is involved.23 
It is difficult to see how identifying the person authorized to 
administer medication or treatment provides any additional safeguard 
for patients,24 since Illinois statutes25 and administrative regulations26 
provide sufficient safeguards against unlicensed professionals 
distributing medications. Moreover, given the acute shortage of 
professional staff at most state hospitals,27 the patient, likely, will 
know well the few professionals involved with his or her actual 
diagnosis and treatment. 
Requiring the court order to specify the anticipated range of 
authorized dosages is even more inappropriate because judges usually 
have little expertise in evaluating the drug regimen and dosage the 
physician proposes, and the specific dosages and medications 
required to stabilize a mental health patient are often a matter of trial 
and error, which may not be stated with certainty at the time of the 
hearing.28 In re Williams provides an example of the legislation’s 
 
 22. In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ill. 1994). 
 23. In re Cynthia S., 759 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 24. In a case that was decided before the statute required the court order to include 
specific medications, the appellate court stated: “[I]mplicit in the authority to administer . . . 
medication is the authority and responsibility to do so safely and correctly.” In re Schaap, 654 
N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 25. “All medications administered to recipients shall be administered only by those 
persons who are legally qualified to do so by the laws of the State of Illinois.” 20 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 1705/7 (2002). See also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1705 (2002); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 65/15-20 (2002); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 95/7.5 (2002). 
 26. Several administrative regulations directly address the issue of authorization to 
provide medications in mental health facilities. The Illinois Administrative Code provides for 
the establishment of a Pharmacy and Therapetics Committee within the Mental Health and 
Developmental Disability Services.This committee is charged with establishing a list of all 
medications that may be used within departmental facilities. 59 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 112.80(b). 
Psychotropic medication may only be prescribed for a recipient after a physical examination. Id. 
§ 112.90. See also Saul J. Morse & Robert John Kane, Nurses Lack Medical Diagnosis and 
Prescriptive Authority Under Illinois Law, 83 ILL. BAR J. 130 (1995). 
 27. See, e.g., Laurie Berclay, Short on Shrinks, WEBMD MEDICAL NEWS ARCHIVE, 
March 29, 2001, at http://my.webmd.com/content/article/31/1728_75846. (reporting that in 
2001, nearly 80% of Illinois counties had one or fewer psychiatrists) (on file with the 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy). 
 28. See, e.g., In re Gwendolyn N., 760 N.E.2d 575, 577-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (rejecting 
an argument that the psychiatrist should have latitude “to exercise her medical judgment in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol14/iss1/13
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arguably unintended result.29 Williams was a patient at Chester 
Mental Health Center who had been charged with attempted murder 
and found unfit to stand trial.30 When he refused to be treated with 
psychotropic medications, a staff psychiatrist petitioned for and 
obtained a court order to administer certain drugs.31 Williams’s 
medications included: up to 100 milligrams of Prolixin per day, up to 
100 milligrams of Prolixin Deconate every two weeks, up to 100 
milligrams of Haldol per day, and 300 milligrams of Haldol Dec IM 
every month “if Prolixin and Prolixin Dec [do] not seem to be 
efficacious in reducing delusions.”32 The trial court found that the 
State proved the factors necessary for involuntary medication and 
completed a standard form stating,  
James Williams shall receive psychotropic medication to be 
administered by members of the clinical staff at Chester 
Mental Health, whose licenses allow them to administer 
psychotropic medications pursuant to Illinois Law. The above-
named staff is authorized to administer psychotropic 
medications to the above[-]named recipient for a period not to 
exceed 90 days.33 
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, reasoning 
that, “[t]he lack of an order specifying the medications and dosages 
precludes, as a practical matter, appellate review of a determination 
that the State has met its burden to prove that the benefits of 
particular medications outweigh the harm to [the patient].”34 
Common sense tells us that few judges would rule that up to 100 
milligrams of Prolixin per day, up to 100 milligrams of Prolixin 
Deconate every two weeks, and up to 100 milligrams of Haldol per 
day represent inappropriate dosage levels, and that a patient would be 
better served by dosages of up to fifty milligrams of Haldol per day 
 
determining which combination of the antipsychotic medications worked best for [the 
patient].”). 
 29. 712 N.E.2d 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 30. Id. at 351. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 352. 
 34. Id. at 353-54. 
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or up to 200 milligrams of Prolixin Deconate every two weeks. In 
other words, with rare exception, judges are incapable of knowing the 
specific medication and dosage required to stabilize a patient. 
Since most trial judges lack any training in pharmacology, it is 
inconceivable that the legislature intended trial judges to “parse” the 
treatment and choose among various medications.35 In what is clearly 
an argument in favor of form over substance, one appellate court, 
while acknowledging that judges have no expertise regarding 
medication, stated that specific medications must be named in the 
order to educate the court, so that it may make an informed judgment 
in its capacity as parens patriae.36  
The transcript of a recent court hearing in Cook County, Illinois, 
keenly demonstrates the difficulty in educating judges on a proposed 
treatment regimen.37 At the conclusion of a trial for involuntary 
medication, following extensive testimony from the treating 
physician and an independent examiner, the trial court offered the 
 
 35. Curiously, requiring the order to specify the exact recommended medications and 
dosages was incorporated in an amendment to the statute in 1997. See 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 5/2-107.1(a)(6) (2002); Pub. Act. 90-538. Even before the amendment, however, some courts 
required witnesses to specifically identify the proposed medication. In one such case, the 
appellate court reversed an order granting involuntary medication even though it acknowledged 
that physicians should not be limited to the use of a particular drug, but should be able to switch 
medications based upon the patient’s reactions. In re Kness, 661 N.E.2d 394, 400 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996). The court stated:  
[W]hile such argument has some practical appeal, nevertheless, we believe that the 
requirements of section 2-107.1(d)(4) cannot be satisfied without the identification of 
the medication proposed to be involuntarily administered to a respondent. Otherwise, 
there can be no meaningful comparison of the benefits of the medication to the side 
effects the recipient might experience. The very general nature of [the psychiatrist’s 
testimony, to wit, that respondent would be monitored for side effects, indicates that he 
had no idea as to what side effects respondent might experience upon the 
administration of such medication. Without such testimony, there is no evidence from 
which the trial court could determine that the benefits outweighed the harm of the 
medication.  
Id. at 400. 
 36. In re Gwendolyn N., 760 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). Even if judges find a 
discrepancy in medication descriptions, their lack of knowledge about medications render them 
without the analytical resources to pursue any inquiry as to the appropriateness of the dosage. 
See, e.g., In re Floyd, 655 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting a discrepancy in the medical 
records and the testimony of the treating physician). 
 37. In re R.K., 786 N.E.2d 212, 215-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
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following insights regarding her understanding of the medication 
being proposed: 
Now, I have a problem here. I might have to ask the doctor a 
couple more questions because, first of all, I believe that all the 
testimony is clear and convincing that, and the State has, 
basically proved that she should have, she—I should authorize 
involuntary treatment. 
. . . 
What I’m not comfortable with and I’m not a doctor so I don’t 
know about this, but I don’t feel comfortable at all authorizing 
the use of Haldol for her. Now he mentioned a couple of other 
medications, Zyprexa or Olanzapine and I don’t know what 
the, I don’t know if they have the same side effects.  
Now I understand his estimation of the difference between the 
dystonic reaction and the tardive diskinesia, but I still—I still 
don’t feel comfortable asking her to take Haldol again.38 
Following more testimony by the physician, the court continued: 
Then what I’m going to propose then is that the Haldol be the 
alternative medication and that they start off trying her with the 
other medicines that don’t have the same side effects. And if 
not, she then refuses those others, then if you need to, then the 
Haldol. But the Haldol as the medicines [sic] last resort.39 
In an apparent attempt to satisfy the statutory requirement, the 
trial judge’s candid admission in the earlier part of the transcript that 
she “didn’t know about” medications did not prevent her from 
second-guessing the recommendation of the treating physician.40 
Interestingly, the trial court’s decision was reversed on appeal, 
despite the trial judge’s efforts to formulate an opinion regarding the 
proposed medication.41 
 
 38. Id. (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 216. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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In In re Kness, the court rejected the argument that a physician 
should have some flexibility in providing for treatment, stating that to 
do so would hamper the trial court’s ability to undertake a 
meaningful comparison of the benefits of the medication and the side 
effects the patient might suffer.42 A meaningful comparison is highly 
unlikely when judges have no experience upon which to make the 
comparison. Since one reviewing court has suggested that courts who 
handle these cases should develop a checklist or a boiler-plate form 
order in which, presumably, medications would be listed in an easy-
to-use format for routine treatment orders,43 any notion that trial 
judges are likely to become better educated is illusory at best. 
The Illinois Supreme Court has acknowledged that juries are 
incapable of deciding specific medication and dosage ranges.44 In 
reversing the appellate court and reinstating a trial court order 
authorizing involuntary medication, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
recently stated:  
[n]othing in the language of section 2-107.1 indicates that 
where the treatment involves more than one medication, the 
legislature intended the jury to parse the treatment and choose 
among the various medications. Similarly, nothing in the 
language of section 2-107.1 indicates that the legislature 
intended treatment orders to authorize something less than 
what the treating physician has prescribed. Accordingly, 
where, as here, the recommended treatment consists of 
multiple medications—some to be administered alternatively, 
some to be administered in combination, and some to be 
administered only as needed to counter side effects—it is only 
this treatment, in its entirety, that may be authorized.”45  
Although the court’s language addressed whether the jury was 
capable of selecting a specific medication remedy, the court’s opinion 
that the legislature intended that treatment orders reflect “what the 
 
 42. In re Kness, 661 N.E.2d 394, 400 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 43. In re Miller, 705 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 44. In re Mary Ann P., 781 N.E.2d 237, 245 (Ill. 2003), rev’d In re Nancy M., 739 N.E.2d 
607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 45. Id. 
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treating physician has prescribed”46 ought to be applied in non-jury 
cases. Nevertheless, the current state of the law in Illinois is that trial 
judges, but not juries, are capable of deciding that patients should 
receive specific medications. However, given the difficulty in 
educating trial judges, juror education would likely be equally 
difficult. 
While a number of Illinois trial courts have been seemingly 
unable or unwilling to comply with the statutory mandate to identify 
persons authorized to distribute specific medications,47 trial courts 
have also had difficulty complying with other procedural 
requirements in the involuntary medication statute,48 despite pleas 
 
 46. Id.  
 47. An alarming number of trial courts have ignored the requirement for specific 
medication and dosage orders. Cases reversing orders for involuntary medication because the 
order failed to specify the medication or the range of dosages include: In re Emmet J., 775 
N.E.2d 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); In re Gloria B., 776 N.E.2d 853 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); In re 
Jennifer H., 775 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), In re Gwendolyn N., 760 N.E.2d 575 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2001), In re Richard C., 769 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); In re Len P., 706 
N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); In re Cynthia S., 759 N.E.2d 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); In re 
Williams, 712 N.E.2d 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). Fortunately, not all courts have adhered to this 
view. In In re Perona, 690 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) the court stated:  
It is not necessary for a respondent to have tried a particular regimen of medicine 
before in order for his doctor to make a valid determination its benefits would 
outweigh the harm it imposed. The expert’s opinion alone is prima facie proof the 
benefits of a medication plan outweigh the harm. 
Id. at 1966 (emphasis added). See also Miller, 705 N.E.2d 144. 
 48. See, e.g., In re Barbara H., 702 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. 1998); In re Evelyn S., 788 N.E.2d 
310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); In re O.C., 788 N.E.2d 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (failure to provide 
notice of medication hearing); In re R.C., 788 N.E.2d 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (failure to appoint 
independent expert at patient’s request); In re Richard C., 769 N.E.2d 1071; In re Cathy M., 
760 N.E.2d 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (denial of the right to counsel); In re Jones, 743 N.E.2d 
1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (appointment of a guardian ad litem is not a substitute for the right to 
counsel); In re E.L., 736 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (dispositional report requirement was 
not met by psychiatrist’s notes and failure to consider evidence that patient took medication on 
the morning of the hearing); In re Janet S., 712 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (failure to allege 
and prove that a good-faith effort had been made to determine whether the patient had executed 
a power of attorney for health care treatment); Miller, 705 N.E.2d 144; In re Timothy H., 704 
N.E.2d 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (failure to give meaning of “clear and convincing” instruction); 
In re Barry B., 693 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); In re Edward S., 698 N.E.2d 186 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1998); In re M.A., 689 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (denial of the right to a jury); In re 
Carmody, 653 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (failure to file formal petition for involuntary 
medication); In re Bontrager, 676 N.E.2d 4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (failure to provide written 
information to the patient regarding the proposed treatment); In re Robinson, 679 N.E.2d 818 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In re DeLong, 682 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (failure to hold 
separate hearing for commitment and involuntary administration of medication); In re Jones, 
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and admonitions from reviewing courts.49 The failure of trial courts to 
follow the basic procedural requirements of the involuntary 
medication statute suggests that change is needed.  
B. Capacity to Make a Reasoned Decision  
Determining when a patient has the capacity to make a reasoned 
decision to refuse medication is a more complex and serious problem 
than failure to follow procedural requirements. Assuming procedural 
errors can be reduced or eliminated, Illinois courts must articulate a 
framework for deciding this important issue.50 To determine whether 
to grant an order for involuntary medications, the trial court must find 
the presence of six factors.51 Five of these six factors may be 
evaluated objectively, thus few appellate courts address these 
factors.52 Psychiatrists or physicians routinely testify objectively to 
establish the presence of a mental illness, the length of time the 
illness has existed, any deteriorating behavior, whether less restrictive 
services have been examined and found inappropriate, and whether 
 
673 N.E.2d 703 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (failure to submit evidence regarding actual suffering, loss 
of ability to function or threatening behavior); People v. Williford, 649 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1995) (failure to allow patient to request interrogatories); People v. DeJesus, 636 N.E.2d 
112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 49. The court in Miller stated, “We urge strict compliance with all procedural safeguards 
set forth in the Code and caution that failure to follow those procedures creates the likelihood of 
reversal.” 705 N.E.2d at 151.  
 Rejecting a claim by the State that procedural errors resulted in a “no-harm-no-foul” 
situation, the court, in DeLong stated:  
[T]he procedural safeguards enacted by the legislature for mental health cases are not 
mere technicalities which may be routinely disregarded by the State. Rather, they are 
essential tools to protect the liberty interests of persons alleged to be mentally ill. We 
believe a harmless error finding would send the wrong signal and suggest that we 
condone the ignoring of clearly established procedural protections. 
682 N.E.2d at 1190-91 (1997) (citations omitted).  
 50. In fairness to the reviewing courts, the number of procedural and other errors that trial 
courts commit usually precludes the reviewing court from addressing the patient’s capacity to 
make a reasoned decision regarding medication. See, e.g., O.C., 788 N.E.2d at 1163; In re 
Nancy M., 739 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 52. Only a small number of the reported Illinois cases reference these objective factors. 
See O.C., 788 N.E.2d 1163; Jones, 673 N.E.2d 703 (reversing trial court order for involuntary 
medication because the testimony failed to state that the patient exhibited deterioration of 
ability to function, suffering, or threatening behavior). 
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the benefits of the medication outweigh the harm.53 However, 
determining whether a patient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned 
decision requires a subjective analysis of the patient’s competency. 
Even though clinical researchers have difficulty defining competency 
or capacity to make a reasoned decision,54 it is important for 
reviewing courts to offer some guidance on this important factor.  
Courts in New York55 and Wisconsin56 have attempted to 
articulate standards for judicial determination of a patient’s legal 
 
 53. See In re Perona, 690 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (testimony of psychiatrist that 
the benefits of the medication outweighed the harm is sufficient); In re Kness, 661 N.E.2d 394 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (testimony of physician regarding deterioration is sufficient). 
 54. See generally Torrey, supra note 1; Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing 
Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 
RUTGERS L. REV. 345 (1996). 
 55. In Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986), the New York Court of Appeals, citing 
Michaels, Competence to Refuse Treatment, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH 
INSTITUTIONS-VALUES IN CONFLICT (A. Edward Dondera & Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982), 
mentioned the following criteria for evaluating capability to consent or refuse treatment:  
(1) the person’s knowledge that he has a choice to make; (2) the patient’s ability to 
understand the available options, their advantages and disadvantages; (3) the patient’s 
cognitive capacity to consider the relevant factors; (4) the absence of any interfering 
pathologic perception or belief, such as a delusion concerning the decision; (5) the 
absence of any interfering emotional state, such as severe manic depression, euphoria 
or emotional disability; (6) the absence of any interfering pathologic motivational 
pressure; (7) the absence of any interfering pathologic relationship, such as the 
conviction of helpless dependency on another person; (8) an awareness of how others 
view the decision, the general social attitude toward the choices and an understanding 
of his reason for deviating from that attitude if he does. 
Id. at 344 n.7 (noting the Court of Appeals does not expressly adopt the list of factors, but 
acknowledges one commentator has suggested the factors).  
 56. In In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894 (Wis. 1994), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
stated that the Wisconsin statute for involuntary medication firmly established only one 
standard for determining if a patient is competent to refuse medication. The person seeking an 
order for involuntary medication “must establish that the patient is unable to express an 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the medication or treatment, and the 
alternatives to accepting the particular medication or treatment offered, after the advantages, 
disadvantages and alternatives have been explained to him or her.” Id. at 899. 
 The court held that the following factors should be considered in reaching its decision: 
(a)  Whether the patient is able to identify the type of recommended medication or 
treatment; 
(b)  whether patient has previously received the type of medication or treatment at 
issue; 
(c)  if the patient has received similar treatment in the past, whether he or she can 
describe what happened as a result and how the effects were beneficial or harmful; 
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competence to refuse psychotropic medication. In deciding whether a 
recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision, most Illinois 
courts simply adopt the analysis and testimony of the expert 
physician witness, without any analytical discussion.57 A few cases 
seem to merge the inquiry into the patient’s capacity to make a 
reasoned decision with an inquiry as to whether the physician or the 
lower court followed all of the procedural guidelines for involuntary 
medication or whether the physician’s testimony was specific enough 
to offer a justification for recommending medication.58 Still other 
courts view “capacity to make a reasoned decision” as a test of 
whether the patient offers a sufficiently rational objection to the 
proposed medication or whether, in the court’s view, the patient 
seems to be functioning at a “high level.”59 For example, in In re 
 
(d)  if the patient has not been similarly treated in the past, whether he or she can 
identify the risks and benefits associated with the recommended medication or 
treatment; and 
(e)  whether the patient holds any patently false beliefs about the recommended 
medication or treatment which would prevent an understanding of legitimate risks and 
benefits.  
Id. at 899-900. 
 57. See, e.g., In re Jill R., 785 N.E.2d 46, 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); In re Dorothy W., 692 
N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); In re Jeffers, 606 N.E.2d 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (agreeing 
with the physician’s testimony and the trial court’s finding that the patient lacked the capacity 
to make a reasoned decision about medication). In re Floyd, 655 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), 
is an example of the appellate court merely reciting the testimony of the physician: “The record, 
as well as Dr. Eisaman’s testimony, shows that respondent lacks the capacity to make a 
reasoned decision about the medication. Sometimes respondent takes his medication; other 
times he does not.” Id. at 18.  
 58. See In re Edward S., 698 N.E.2d 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); In re Bontrager, 676 N.E.2d 
4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
 59. See, e.g., In re R.K., 786 N.E.2d 212, 218 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“[T]he record shows 
that while hospitalized, respondent functioned at a high level, was alert, polite, and oriented to 
time and place . . . [H]er alleged lack of insight did not alone prove that she was incapable of 
making a reasoned decision about her treatment”). See also In re Jones, 673 N.E.2d 703 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1996). In Jones, the patient testified that her reasons for refusing the medication were 
that “she did not want to take this medication because she had doctor’s orders not to because it 
would kill her. She stated that she experienced seven hours of trauma at Danville when 
medication was forced upon her.” Id. at 705. Without commenting on how the court reached its 
decision, the appellate court simply stated that it agreed the patient lacked the capacity to make 
a reasoned decision, because the “objections concerning the medications were not rational. 
While Jones offered specific reasons for refusing the medical treatment, we find that such 
evidence does not render her testimony ‘clear’ evidence of her competent wishes concerning the 
administration of medication.” Id. (citations omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol14/iss1/13
p385 Whitfeild book pages.doc  12/15/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Capacity, Competency, and Courts 401 
 
 
Jeffers the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision that the 
patient lacked the ability to make a reasoned decision by suggesting 
that the physician’s testimony of the patient’s need for medication 
outweighed the patient’s rational views for refusing the medication.60 
In re Israel represents one of only two Illinois cases in which a 
trial court attempted to articulate a standard for determining whether 
a patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding 
medication.61 In Israel, after acknowledging the list of factors the 
cases from Wisconsin and New York used, the court declined to 
adopt either list in its entirety and instead borrowed several factors 
from each jurisdiction, including:  
(1) The person’s knowledge that he has a choice to make; 
(2) The person’s ability to understand the available options, 
their advantages and disadvantages; 
(3) Whether the commitment is voluntary or involuntary; 
(4) Whether the person has previously received the type of 
medication or treatment at issue; 
(5) If the person has received similar treatment in the past, 
whether he can describe what happened as a result and how the 
effects were beneficial or harmful; and  
(6) The absence of any interfering pathologic perceptions or 
beliefs or interfering emotional states which might prevent an 
understanding of legitimate risks and benefits.62 
 
 60. 606 N.E.2d 727, 732. The court stated: 
[A]lthough . . . merely disagreeing with the treating psychiatrist does not show an 
inability to make a reasoned decision, we disagree that merely presenting a purportedly 
nondeluded reason for refusing the medication shows that [the patient] has the ability 
to make a reasoned decision . . . . [T]he mere fact that [the patient] understood the 
options available does not mean that she has the ability to appropriately balance those 
options and make a reasoned decision . . . Based on our review of the testimony 
considered by the trial court, we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to 
support the trial court’s finding that respondent lacked the ability to make a reasoned 
decision.  
Id.  
 61. 664 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 62. Id. at 1040. 
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The court, however, held that “[n]one of these enumerated factors 
should be considered dispositive, and a court should consider any 
other relevant factors which it deems might be present.” Although the 
court’s attempt at analysis is encouraging, this court decided that 
involuntary medication was not warranted primarily because the 
patient had “rationally explained the basis for his refusal to take the 
medications.”63 The dissenting judge actually used the factors and 
noted that the patient exhibited “interfering pathological perceptions 
or beliefs which might prevent an understanding of legitimate risks 
and benefits. (Factor No. 6 in majority’s discussion.) This factor 
appears to directly complement factor No. 2, the person’s ability to 
understand the available options, their advantages and 
disadvantages.”64  
Two years later, in In re Barry B., the appellate court, using the 
Israel factors, held that an involuntary medication order was 
appropriate.65 The court explained: 
[T]he record contained evidence of interfering pathologic 
perceptions or beliefs or emotional states that undoubtedly 
prevented respondent from understanding the legitimate risks 
and benefits. It was not unreasonable to conclude that 
respondent’s pathologic perceptions prevented him from being 
able to understand the risks and benefits of medication. 
Respondent testified that he saw the benefit of medications, but 
not for himself. Respondent’s failure to perceive any benefit 
whatsoever from the medications flew in the face of . . . expert 
testimony concerning the benefits of such medications and of 
the testimony of both respondent’s mother and friend that such 
medications helped to stabilize his behavior. Likewise, it was 
not unreasonable to conclude that respondent’s emotional state 
also prevented him from being able to understand the risks and 
benefits of medication.66 
 
 63. Id. at 1041. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 693 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 66. Id. at 886. 
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One might argue that in reaching opposite results, the Barry and 
Israel courts simply used the factors as a way to guide the analysis 
and discussion. Because none of the factors are dispositive, a court is 
free to choose which of the factors it thinks is most important in 
justifying its decision. I will not suggest that one list of factors is 
more appropriate than another since “[t]here are several available 
options ranging from identifying general characteristics of acceptable 
decisions (e.g., ‘sufficient capacity to make or communicate 
responsible decisions’) to identifying the components of a 
competence standard (e.g., evidencing a choice, understanding and 
appreciation).”67 Different decision-makers can always reach 
opposite conclusions so long as there is an articulated method or 
process for reaching that conclusion. The point is that decision-
makers need to articulate a method or process for deciding whether 
the patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding 
medication. In most of the cases decided in Illinois, no attempt has 
been made at such an articulation.  
III. A PROPOSAL FOR DECIDING INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION 
DISPUTES 
The actual number of involuntary medication petitions in Illinois 
is relatively small.68 Given the relatively small number of petitions 
 
 67. Berg et al., supra note 54, at 389. 
 68. In a study done by researchers at Choate Mental Heath Center, the number of petitions 
for court ordered medications in Illinois in calendar years 2001 and 2002 were reported as 
follows: 
Alton Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 61 73 
Patients Treated 642 488 
Number Granted 52 51 
Number Denied 0 3 
Chester Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 39 49 
Patients Treated 460 451 
Number Granted 36 48 
Number Denied 0 1 
Choate Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 22 23 
Patients Treated 620 617 
Number Granted 16 15 
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for involuntary medication, a legitimate question is raised as to 
whether the judicial model for making involuntary medication 
decisions is warranted. This is especially true given the experience in 
Illinois trial courts over the past ten years. Many of the cases 
involving involuntary medication are decided by associate judges69 
who generally have little judicial experience and little incentive to 
develop expertise in this area. Compounding this problem, many of 
the involuntary medication cases are likely to be assigned to assistant 
 
Number Denied 0 0 
Elgin Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 131 51 
Patients Treated 1889 1958 
Number Granted 50 17 
Number Denied 16 8 
Madden Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 10 1 
Patients Treated 2152 2505 
Number Granted 7 1 
Number Denied 1 0 
McFarland Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 12 10 
Patients Treated 792 896 
Number Granted 7 4 
Number Denied 1 1 
Read Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 27 10 
Patients Treated 1942 2162 
Number Granted 21 7 
Number Denied 1 1 
Tinley Park Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 5 9 
Patients Treated 2101 2222 
Number Granted 4 5 
Number Denied 0 0 
Zeller Mental Health Center 2000 2001 
Number of Petitions 87 67 
Patients Treated 533 605 
Number Granted 51 42 
Number Denied 14 9 
 
 69. There are two types of trial judges in Illinois. Circuit judges may hear any case 
assigned to them by the Chief Judge. Associate judges may not preside over criminal cases in 
which the defendant is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment for one year or 
more (felonies), unless approval is received from the Illinois Supreme Court. Circuit judges are 
elected for a term of six years; associate judges are appointed by the circuit judges in 
accordance with the Illinois Supreme Court’s rules for a four-year term. See 705 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 35/2; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/2; ILL. SUP. CT. RULE 39. 
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state’s attorneys and assistant public defenders, who also have little 
incentive or interest in making this area of the law their specialty.70 
Since Illinois trial judges lack expertise and have demonstrated an 
inability to consistently follow the statutory procedural requirements, 
strong consideration should be given for a statutory amendment that 
would assign involuntary medication cases to Department of Human 
Services administrative law judges.  
If petitions for involuntary medication were heard by 
administrative law judges rather than by trial court judges, there 
would be several immediate benefits, including: (1) development of 
judges with special expertise in this evolving field; (2) consistency in 
opinions rendered; (3) and reduction in the number of appellate 
decisions.  
Hearings conducted by administrative law judges would provide 
the same basic procedural rights presently accorded to mental health 
patients. Administrative hearings would allow parties to be present, 
to be represented by counsel, to have pre-hearing conferences and to 
have all of the other procedural and substantive rights associated with 
hearings before the circuit court.71 Specialized administrative judges 
could be expected to receive training regarding psychotropic 
medications and general psychiatry, which would allow them to make 
 
 70. As one author stated, “[e]mpirical surveys consistently demonstrate that the quality of 
counsel ‘remains the single most important factor in the disposition of involuntary civil 
commitment cases.’” Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 3, at 120. “Few jurisdictions currently have 
in place a statewide system of independent, vigorous effective counsel whose job is to provide 
across-the-board representation for institutionalized patients in individual cases.” Id. at 121. 
Quality of counsel is likely to be the most important factor in involuntary medication cases as 
well. Admittedly, my proposal to present involuntary medication hearings before an 
administrative law judge would not address the problem of poorly trained and poorly motivated 
counsel. 
 71. See generally ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 8, 9, § 508.110 (1996). Persons subject to a petition 
for involuntary medication would not be afforded the right to a jury trial if the cases were 
assigned to an administrative law judge, however, jury trials in involuntary medication cases are 
a rarity. Moreover, the benefits of having the petition heard by a trained administrative law 
judge may lessen the need for patients to seek a trial by jury. Illinois Administrative Law 
Judges currently adjudicate a variety of matters. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/22 (discipline of 
physicians under the Medical Practice act); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15 (labor disputes); Chand 
v. Patla, 795 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (termination of physician’s ability to participate in 
medical assistance program). The large number of administrative agencies functioning in a 
“judicial” role serves to relieve the court of hearing numberous cases while preserving the 
complete authority of the court to insure the proper application of the law. See generally 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
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informed decisions regarding medication regimens.72 Although such 
training could be made available to judges in the circuit court, most 
Illinois counties rotate assignments so that a judge would not 
normally hear mental health or involuntary medication cases on a 
permanent basis.73 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Involuntary medication cases in Illinois have proven to be an 
embarrassment for the State. The procedural and substantive errors 
revealed by appellate case warrants an overwhelming need for 
improvements to the system. Assigning cases to administrative law 
judges does not remove the judiciary from the process, as appellate 
courts would still maintain supervision over the substantive law and 
would insure that administrative courts follow the procedural 
requirements of the Illinois statute. It is time to try another system. 
 
 72. There is a growing body of literature that suggests, for instance, that minorities, 
particularly black males, receive higher dosages of psychotropic medications than whites, and 
that they are more likely to develop tardive diskinesia and other unwanted side effects. In 
addition, research shows that members of different races receive differential dosages of 
psychotropic medications, and specifically that blacks receive higher dosages of psychotropic 
medication than whites. Judges with training may be able to recognize this disparity and make 
decisions accordingly. 
 73. As an example, between 1996 and 2002, six different judges heard involuntary 
medication cases in Peoria County. Between 1995 and 2001, no fewer than seven judges heard 
involuntary medication cases in Kane County. 
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